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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Karly Irene Elwood entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of possession of
methamphetamine and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia, preserving
her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress. Ms. Elwood asserts that the district
court erred by denying her motion to suppress evidence because police illegally detained her
without reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime was afoot.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On March 20, 2016, at approximately midnight, officers were dispatched to a house for
suspicious circumstances. (7/26/16 Tr., p.14, L.13 – p.15, L.23.) A neighbor reported that a
white car was parked in the driveway of a house that was believed to be bank-owned and
uninhabited. (7/26/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.6-20.) When the officers arrived at the house, there was no
vehicle in the driveway. (7/26/16 Tr., p.42, Ls.7-12.) The officers looked around and found no
points of access and no forced entry inside the house, but noticed that the house appeared
abandoned and had notices in the window stating the property was bank-owned. (7/26/16
Tr., p.16, Ls.2-18, p.23, L.19 – p.24, L.9.) However, when the officers peeked in the windows,
they saw drink cups and food items inside the house. (7/26/16 Tr., p.23, Ls.13-18.)
After completing the call notes, Officer Orvis saw a silver passenger car pull up in front
of the house, parallel to the road. (7/26/16 Tr., p.24, L.10 – p.25, L.10; State’s Exhibit 4.) The
car pulled up facing the opposite lane of traffic. (7/26/16 Tr., p.24, Ls.16-21.) The driver
exited the car and walked towards the front door of the house. (7/26/16 Tr., p.26, Ls.1-13.)
Officer Orvis made contact with the driver, who said he was there helping a friend move.
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(7/26/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.5-13.) Officer Orvis obtained the driver’s identification card and then
ordered him to go back to the car. (7/26/16 Tr., p.50, Ls.2-12.)
Officer Orvis then obtained identification or driver’s licenses from all of the passengers
in the car. (7/26/16 Tr., p.31, L.9 – p.32, L.11.) After he had collected these items, he went
back to his car and moved it so that it was behind the silver car, with the emergency lights
flashing. (7/26/16 Tr., p.28, Ls.13-19, p.31, Ls.9-12.) Officer Orvis called in the driver and
passengers to dispatch. (7/26/16 Tr., p.28, Ls.13-16, p.32, Ls.9-23.) He also ran his K-9, Faro,
around the car. (7/26/16 Tr., p.31, Ls.5-8.) After Faro alerted, Officer Orvis interviewed
Ms. Elwood who admitted to having a container with two blue pills in it. (7/26/16 Tr., p.35,
Ls.17-25.) Upon learning she was going to be transported to county jail, Ms. Elwood asked for
her purse, which contained multiple items of drug paraphernalia. (R., p.9.) A foil package
containing a substance that tested presumptively positive for methamphetamine was located in
a black bag behind the headrest of the seat in which Ms. Elwood was sitting. (R., p.10.)
Based on these facts, the State filed an Information which alleged that Ms. Elwood
committed two counts of possession of methamphetamine. 1

(R., pp.30-31.)

Thereafter,

Ms. Elwood filed a Motion and Memorandum in Support of Motion to Suppress and two
affidavits in support of her motion to suppress. (R., pp.40-49, 62-66.) She asserted that the
evidence gathered against her should be suppressed for three reasons: First, any reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity had dissipated by the time Ms. Elwood arrived at the house;
second, her initial warrantless detention was not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion;
and third, Officer Orvis abandoned the purpose for the traffic stop and impermissibly extended

1

Ms. Elwood was also charged with misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia in the
companion case, Canyon County case number CR 2016-5300, a case consolidated on appeal
with this case, Canyon County case number CR 2016-5250. (R., p.165.)
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the duration of the stop to allow the K-9 sniff of the car. (R., pp.40-49, 62-66.) A hearing was
held on Ms. Elwood’s motion. (R., pp.51-54; 7/26/16 Tr.) After the hearing, the State filed its
objection to Ms. Elwood’s motion to suppress. (R., pp.68-74.)
Twenty-seven days later, the district court denied both the motion to enlarge time to file
a motion to suppress and the motion to suppress itself. (R., pp.108-127.) The district court
denied Ms. Elwood’s motion to suppress finding that the motion was filed twenty-seven days
late and neither good cause nor excusable neglect excused the late filing, but even had the
motion been timely filed, the initial stop was lawful, the officer had reasonable, articulable
suspicion to do a driver’s license/identification check on all of the occupants of the vehicle
because he believed they were about to engage in unlawful behavior by entering the vacant
house, the length of the investigatory detention was not unlawfully extended, and the canine
alert gave the officers probable cause to search the interior of the vehicle. (R., pp.108-127.)
In denying the motion to suppress on the merits, the district court held that the initial
encounter between Officer Orvis and the driver was consensual:
The initial encounter was essentially consensual and only developed into an
investigatory detention when Officer Orvis requested driver’s licenses and/or
identification from the driver of the vehicle and its occupants.
(R., p.119). The court concluded, at the time Officer Orvis asked for the identification from
the passengers, that he had reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe that the driver and/or
the passengers in the car may have, or were about to engage in unlawful behavior by entering
the vacant house. (R., p.124.)
The court concluded:
Also, though the purpose of the investigation may initially have been to determine
whether a citation for the traffic violations observed was appropriate or whether
the parties had illegally entered or were about to enter the empty residence,
Officer Orvis’ testimony disclosed at least three other factual circumstances that
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would support a reasonable suspicion that one or more of the vehicle’s occupants
possessed controlled substances.
First, Officer Orvis testified that upon his initial contact with the passengers in the
vehicles [sic], he recognized Mr. Schlapia as an individual that he knew to be the
subject of prior Nampa City Police investigations for illegal use and distribution
of narcotics. While this fact alone may have provided an adequate basis for
reasonable suspicion, it isn’t the only factor that was observed by Officer Orvis at
that time. Officer Orvis also observed that when he made contact with the
Defendant she had difficulty answering simple questions, was making quick jerky
movements, and appeared nervous. Officer Orvis testified that, based upon his
training and experience, those characteristics can indicate that the person is under
the influence of narcotics. Finally, Officer Orvis also testified that while he was
providing the vehicle occupants’ identification information to dispatch so that a
warrant check could be run, he had observed furtive movements by the vehicle
occupants, consistent with an attempt to hide or conceal something in the vehicle.
Taken together, these factors provide an adequate basis for the officer to
reasonably suspect that the vehicle’s occupants were in possession of illegal
narcotics, and thus the officer had not impermissibly expanded the scope of the
investigation beyond what the facts confronting him suggested.
(R., p.123) (internal citations omitted). The court then found:
When Officer Orvis approached the suspect vehicle to gather identification from
the occupants, the focus of his investigation quickly shifted form the earlier
inquiry to an investigation of illicit drug activities, based on the furtive
movements of the vehicle occupants, the Defendant’s behaviors suggesting
narcotics impairment, and the recognition of Mr. Schlapia with knowledge of his
background in illegal drug activities.
(R., p.124.)
The court concluded that Officer Orvis had reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
driver and passengers were involved in criminal activity regarding the house. The court also
concluded that, when Officer Orvis spoke to the passengers and obtained their identification,
he had reasonable, articulable suspicion that the passengers in the car were involved in drug
activity:
After Officer Orvis had provided the information to dispatch, and before
dispatch responded to the check, Officer Orvis proceeded to run his K-9, Faro,
around the suspect vehicle. Officer Orvis ran his drug canine around the
suspect vehicle based on circumstances of this contact, including the late night
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suspicious activity call, his personal familiarity with Mr. Schlapia’s prior
history of involvement with illegal narcotics transactions in Nampa, the furtive
movements of the vehicle’s occupants, the reluctance or difficulty the vehicle
occupants demonstrated in providing identifying information and eye
avoidance.2 The K-9 alerted at an external location between the front and rear
passenger doors of the Toyota.
(R., p.113)3 (footnote added).)
Ms. Elwood entered a conditional guilty plea, pleading guilty to two counts of felony
possession of a controlled substance and one count of misdemeanor possession of drug
paraphernalia but preserving her right to appeal the denial of the motion to suppress. (8/15/16
Tr., p.88, Ls.4-9; 8/17/16 Tr., p.99, Ls.3-23, p.103, L.19 – p.107, L.2, p.124, L.22 – p.125, L.1;
12/12/16 Tr., p.147, L.19 – p.148, L.9; R., pp.90-103.) On December 20, 2016, the district
court withheld judgment and placed Ms. Elwood on probation for four years. (12/12/16
Tr., p.167, Ls.2-7; R., pp.153-155.) On January 17, 2017, Ms. Elwood filed a Notice of
Appeal timely from the district court’s Order of Probation on Withheld Judgment. (R., pp.156159.)

2

The district court conducted the analysis without acknowledging that a dog sniff is not a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment and therefore does not have to be justified by
reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
707 (1983). Further, the court also found, pursuant to United States v. Rodriguez, 135 S.
Ct. 1609, 1614-16 (2015), that the dog sniff did not extend the duration of the stop.
(R., pp.113, 122.) It is not clear why the district court analyzed whether the officer had
reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug activity in these circumstances.
3
These findings are not a verbatim recitation of the entirety of the district court’s four pages of
facts.
5

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Elwood’s motion to enlarge time to file a
motion to suppress?

II.

Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Elwood’s motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Elwood’s Motion To Enlarge Time To File A Motion
To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Ms. Elwood did not file her motion to suppress within the time limit designated by

I.C.R. 12(d). However, Ms. Elwood asserts that the district court erred in denying her motion
to enlarge the time to file a motion to suppress where she demonstrated good cause and
excusable neglect. Ms. Elwood asserts that the neglect of her attorney was excusable in that
she was overburdened with an excessive caseload. She further asserts that she has shown good
cause in that the interests of judicial economy warranted the district court hearing her motion to
suppress on its merits. This is particularly true where, at the time the district court denied the
motion, it was moot because the suppression hearing had already been held and the motion to
suppress decided on the merits.

Thus, Ms. Elwood asserts that the district court acted

inconsistently with applicable law.

B.

Relevant Rules And Standard Of Review
Idaho Criminal Rule 12 governs the filings of pre-trial pleadings and motions, generally,

and motions to suppress evidence, specifically.

I.C.R. 12(b)(3). Rule 12(d) governs the

timelines for filing such motions and reads as follows:
Motions under Rule 12(b) must be filed within 28 days after the entry of a plea
of not guilty or seven days before trial whichever is earlier. In felony cases,
motions under 12(b) must be brought on for hearing within 14 days after filing
or 48 hours before trial, whichever is earlier. The court may shorten or enlarge
the time and, for good cause shown or for excusable neglect, may relieve a
party of failure to comply with this rule.
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I.C.R. 12(d) (emphasis added).
When an exercise of discretion is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a
multi-tiered inquiry. The sequence of the inquiry is: (1) whether the lower court rightly
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and
(3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho
598, 600 (1989).

C.

The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Elwood’s Motion To Enlarge Time To File A
Motion To Suppress Where Ms. Elwood Demonstrated Both Good Cause And
Excusable Neglect
Ms. Elwood asserts that she showed excusable neglect and good cause, and that the

district court abused its discretion in denying her motion to enlarge time. Idaho Criminal Rule
12(d) requires motions to suppress to be filed “within 28 days after the entry of a plea of not
guilty or seven days before trial whichever is earlier.” I.C.R. 12(d). Ms. Elwood’s motion to
enlarge time and motion to suppress were filed on June 23, 2016, twenty-seven days late.
(R., pp.38, 40, 109.)

At the hearing on the motions to enlarge time and to suppress,

Ms. Elwood’s counsel told the district court that she did not file a timely motion to suppress
because she was handling a heavy caseload of 140 active cases, and she failed to calendar the
motion to suppress deadline. (8/8/16 Tr., p.7, L.23 – p.8, L.13; Augmentation, p.1.) She also
did not have contact with her client for almost two months after arraignment. (8/8/16 Tr., p.7,
Ls.17-23.) Ms. Elwood’s attorney’s failure to timely file the motion to suppress stemmed from
poor communication and poor file management. Defense counsel admitted she was at fault,
but asked the court to find good cause or excusable neglect for the late filing. (7/26/16 Tr., p.7,
L.23 – p.8, L.13.)
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Counsel’s failure to timely file the motion was certainly neglectful; however,
Ms. Elwood asserts that this neglect was excusable given the difficulties of representation by
an overworked public defender. The National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA)
National Advisory Commission Standards on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, Defense
Standard 13.12 provides: “The caseload of a public defender office should not exceed the
following: felonies per attorney per year: not more than 150.” See http://www.nlada.org/
defender-standards/national-advisory-commission/black-letter. Defense counsel told the court
she was handling 140 active cases at that time, which is far beyond the recommended
standards.4 (Augmentation, p.1.) In light of these alleged statewide problems, it certainly does
not behoove the courts to further compound the public defense shortcomings by penalizing
public defense clients for untimely filings.
Although the district court did not dispute the existence of an overburdened public
defense system in Canyon County,5 it ultimately denied the motion, finding that “[n]either
good cause nor excusable neglect have been establish that support entry of an order enlarging
the time for filing the Motion to Suppress.” (R., pp.114-117.) In denying the motion, the court
wrote, “Likewise, if this long period of delay is justifiable because of the heavy case load

4

There is a pending class action lawsuit against the State of Idaho, Tucker v. State, a case in
which plaintiffs alleged that the State is providing constitutionally insufficient representation to
its indigent residents. Tucker v. State, 162, Idaho 11, __, 394 P.3d 54, 62 (2017) (“Appellants
alleged systemic, statewide deficiencies plaguing Idaho’s public defense system. Appellants
seek to vindicate their fundamental right to constitutionally adequate public defense at the
State’s expense, as required under the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I,
Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution.”) In Tucker, “Appellants allege their injuries are due, in
part, to a ‘lack of ongoing training and professional development’ for public defenders, and
public defenders’ crushing caseloads. They explain that many public defenders’ caseloads are
‘well above national standards and impossible for one person to handle effectively.’” 394 P.3d
at 67. The Tucker plaintiffs’ Complaint was filed in 2015. Id. at 59.
9

noted, absent other unanticipated or unavoidable circumstances, then good cause and excusable
neglect would exist for untimely motions in virtually all criminal cases being handled by the
public defender’s office in this county.” (R., p.116.)
Despite the district court’s recognition that such a problem existed, it refused to find
such constituted the “good cause” or “excusable neglect” required by Rule 12(d). The court’s
decision effectively punished Ms. Elwood for the struggling public defense system in Idaho.
Such was an abuse of discretion.

Ms. Elwood asserts that the district court abused its

discretion in denying her motion to enlarge time, by acting inconsistently with applicable legal
standards in failing to recognize the neglect displayed was excusable.
Additionally, even if this Court determines that the district court did not abuse its
discretion on the excusable neglect question, Ms. Elwood asserts that the district court abused
its discretion in failing to grant the motion to enlarge time for good cause shown. The interests
of judicial economy would have been best served by the district court hearing the motion to
suppress. Absent successfully prosecuting this appeal, Ms. Elwood can pursue an otherwise
unnecessary post-conviction action against the public defender’s office and the deficient
performance prong is easily established. See generally, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). Whether the district court rules in her favor or in favor of the State in postconviction proceedings, the aggrieved party would be able to appeal the decision, thus,
saddling the appellate courts with an additional, yet otherwise unnecessary, appeal.

See

I.C. § 19-4909.

5

The court noted, “[t]he court is aware that the Defendant’s counsel, like the other public
defenders, prosecutors and even the judges serving this county carry a heavy caseload. The
court is sympathetic with this plight.” (R., p.115.)
10

Furthermore, although not specifically listed as a factor to consider in I.C.R. 12(d), the
State was prepared to, and did, address the merits of the suppression motion during the July 26,
2016 hearing. (7/26/16 Tr., p.11, L.17 – p.73, L.5.) The hearing on Ms. Elwood’s motion to
enlarge time was held nearly a month before trial was scheduled to begin. (7/26/16 Tr., p.71,
Ls.22-23.)
In denying the motion to enlarge time, the district court wrote, “. . . the result of the
delay is that the court was requited [sic] to consider these motions so close to the scheduled
trial.” (R., p.116.) Ms. Elwood recognizes that there is no case law (that she is aware of) that
defines the meaning of “good cause” (or “excusable neglect” for that matter) as used in
I.C.R. 12(d). However, Ms. Elwood asserts that where there is no prejudice to the State,
judicial economy considerations do constitute good cause to enlarge the time to hear a motion
to suppress. Motions to suppress are the vehicle by which a defendant can keep illegally
obtained evidence from being used against him or her. See I.A.R. 12(b)(3). Ms. Elwood
asserts that where an opportunity for a full and fair hearing on the merits of an untimely motion
to suppress can be held, where the State is prepared to address the merits of the motion, where
a ruling can be issued well before trial, and where doing so avoids the unnecessary costs of
post-conviction litigation, good cause has been shown. Thus, Ms. Elwood asserts the district
court abused its discretion in denying her motion to enlarge time to file her motion to suppress.

D.

The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Elwood’s Motion To Enlarge Time To File A
Motion To Suppress Where The Motion Had Either Been Impliedly Granted Or Had
Become Moot As The District Court Had Already Held A Hearing And Issued A
Written Ruling On The Merits
On June 23, 2016, Ms. Elwood filed her motion to enlarge time to file a motion to

suppress simultaneously with her motion to suppress. (R., pp.38-49.) She asked the court “to
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enlarge the time for filing pre-trial motions” and included an affidavit in which she asserted
that she had 140 active cases. (R., p.38; Augmentation, p.1.) The district court held a hearing
on both motions on July 26, 2016. (R., pp.51-54; 7/26/16 Tr.) It first heard the motion to
enlarge time. (7/26/16 Tr., p.6, L.14 – p.11, L.17.) After hearing defense counsel’s reasons for
the untimely motion to suppress, the district court said, “I’ll take it under advisement and
consideration. So I’m letting you know I still may not grant the motion to enlarge, but I want
to review it and think about the context of what we’re doing. All right. So on the motion to
suppress.” (7/26/16 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-17.) The State called Officer Orvis who testified at length
regarding the incident giving rise to Ms. Elwood’s criminal charges. (7/26/16 Tr., p.12, L.10 –
p.70, L.14.)
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the district court offered the parties an
opportunity to submit additional briefing based upon the testimony. (7/26/16 Tr., p.71, L.2 –
p.73, L.5.) After both parties submitted supplemental briefing in support of their positions
(R., pp.62-75), the district court issued a written decision twenty-two days after hearing the
motion to suppress (R., pp.108-136). In its order on defendant’s motion to enlarge time and
motion to suppress evidence, the district court went through the facts of both motions,
including a five page summary of the facts adduced at the suppression hearing, analyzed the
legal authority, and denied both motions. (R., pp.108-126.) Although it began its analysis of
the merits of the motion to suppress by writing, “Even if the Motion to Suppress had been
timely filed, it would not be granted,” the court went on, in over eight pages, to analyze the
facts of Ms. Elwood’s case with the relevant legal authority. (R., pp.117-135.)
However, the district court had already impliedly granted the motion by holding a
suppression hearing, allowing the parties additional time to submit briefing in support of their
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arguments, and then issuing a written decision on the merits of the suppression motion. The
fact is, by the time the district court denied the motion, it was moot—all of the time necessary
to proceed with the motion to suppress had been taken, thus, time had already been “enlarged”
to allow the suppression motion, hearing, briefing, decision, etc. There was nothing left for the
court to decide.
In State v. Youmans, the Idaho Court of Appeals explained:
A question is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial
determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome. State v.
Manzanares, 152 Idaho 410, 419, 272 P.3d 382, 391 (2012); State v. Long, 153
Idaho 168, 170, 280 P.3d 195, 197 (Ct. App. 2012). Even where a question is
moot, there are three exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) when there is the
possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising the
issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and this
is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of
substantial public interest. State v. Barclay, 149 Idaho 6, 8, 232 P.3d 327, 329
(2010).
State v. Youmans, 161 Idaho 4 (Ct. App. 2016).
The motion to enlarge was mooted, if not by the hearing, at least by the time the court
issued its ultimate ruling on the merits of the suppression motion, which was issued
simultaneously with the filing of the order denying the motion to enlarge time to file a motion
to suppress. Where the purpose of the I.C.R. 12(d) motion is for judicial efficiency, holding a
hearing, allowing additional time for the parties to submit briefing based on what was adduced
at the hearing, then issuing a written decision on the merits of the motion effectively negates
any reason to decide a motion for enlargement of time to file a motion to suppress.
In State v. Dice, the Idaho Court of Appeals held, “If no good cause or excusable
neglect was established to the satisfaction of the district court, the motion should not have been
heard.” State v. Dice, 126 Idaho 595, 597 (Ct. App. 1994) (holding that “[a]llowing untimely
motions to be heard because they appear meritorious eviscerates the purpose of the rule.”).
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The district court erred in denying the motion, as it had been mooted and/or its purpose
eviscerated when the court heard and decided the suppression issue.

II.
The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Elwood’s Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Ms. Elwood asserts that the police officer’s taking of her driver’s license was an

unlawful seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Any investigation of the house had
concluded when the car in which Ms. Elwood was a passenger pulled up in front of the house,
and the driver’s justification for going toward the front entrance did not give rise to reasonable
and articulable suspicion that Ms. Elwood, a passenger still sitting in the car, was engaged in
criminal wrongdoing. The facts known to the officer were insufficient to establish a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity by Ms. Elwood. Ms. Elwood was unlawfully seized when
Officer Orvis obtained her identification, thus, the district court erred by denying
Ms. Elwood’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained.

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.” State v. Holland, 135

Idaho 159, 161 (2000). When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate
court should “accept the trial court’s findings of fact which were supported by substantial
evidence, but freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”
Id.
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C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Ms. Elwood’s Motion To Suppress Where
Officer Orvis Seized Ms. Elwood Absent Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion Of
Criminal Wrongdoing
Officer Orvis agreed that Ms. Elwood, as a passenger in the car, was detained when he

took the driver’s identification. (7/26/16 Tr., p.51, L.24 – p.52, L.1.) She was detained when
Officer Orvis obtained her identification. (7/26/16 Tr., p.52, Ls.2-7.) The district court found
that “[a]ll parties were reasonably detained while the identification, driver’s license and
warrants check was being conducted.” (R., p.123.) The sole issue in this case is whether that
detention was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. It was not.
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from
unreasonable search and seizure.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796 (2003). “Article I,
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution nearly identically guarantees that ‘[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures shall not be violated.’” State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 886 (2015) (alteration in
original). A warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable, unless it falls within “one of
several narrowly drawn exceptions.” State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706 (2012). The State
bears the burden of demonstrating a warrantless search or seizure falls into an exception to the
warrant requirement. State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470, 472 (Ct. App. 2002).
This prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to investigatory
detentions of a person falling short of arrest, as well as formal arrests. State v. Gutierrez, 137
Idaho 647, 65 (2002); State v. Knapp, 120 Idaho 343, 346 (Ct. App. 1991). Although an arrest
of an individual must be based on probable cause, police may seize a person through an
investigatory stop without probable cause, provided there is a reasonable articulable suspicion
of criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968); Knapp, 120 Idaho at 346-47;
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State v. Cook, 106 Idaho 209, 220 (1984). An investigative detention is permissible if it is
based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion that the detained person is, has
been, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity. State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983
(Ct. App. 2003). The purpose of a traffic stop is not permanently fixed at the moment the stop
is initiated, however, for during the course of the detention there may evolve suspicion of
criminality different from that which initially prompted the stop. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho
357, 362 (Ct. App. 2000).
“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific, articulable facts and the rational
inferences that can be drawn from those facts.” State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013)
(quoting State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009)). “[A]n officer may take into account his
experience and law enforcement training in drawing inferences from facts gathered,” State v.
Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 411, 283 P.3d 722, 728 (2012), but “[t]he officer, of course, must be
able to articulate something more than an ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’”
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); see also Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112 (same).
“The test for reasonable suspicion is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the
officer at or before the time of the stop.” Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112. The State bears the
burden of proving that an investigatory stop or detention is based on reasonable suspicion and
is limited in its scope and duration to the issue being investigated. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 500 (1983).
“In order to satisfy constitutional standards, an investigative stop must be justified by a
reasonable suspicion on the part of the police, based upon specific articulable facts, that the
person to be seized has committed or is about to commit a crime.” State v. Sevy, 129 Idaho
613, 615 (Ct. App. 1997). Reasonable suspicion may be based on a message an officer
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receives from dispatch, rather than personal observations, if the message was based upon facts
that themselves give rise to reasonable suspicion. Id. The reasonableness of the officer’s
suspicion is evaluated based on the “totality of the circumstances at the time.” Id. In other
words, the “collective knowledge” of all the officers and dispatchers involved. State v. Van
Dorne, 139 Idaho 961, 964 (Ct. App. 2004).
A seizure occurs when officers detain someone through physical force or show of
authority. State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843 (2004). A seizure occurs when an officer secures
the driver’s license of a pedestrian or the passenger of an automobile and runs his or her name
through dispatch to check for outstanding warrants. State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703, 707
(Ct. App. 2007). Once the driver of a vehicle is seized, the passenger reasonably feels subject
to suspicion and is also seized. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 257-259 (2007).
In State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court found that no seizure
has occurred when an officer simply approaches an individual on the street or other public
place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, or by putting questions to him if
he is willing to listen. Id. at 844. In Page there was no indication that the officer threatened or
touched Mr. Page, displayed his weapon, or exhibited other intimidating behavior that would
indicate Mr. Page was not free to simply discontinue the encounter and walk away. Id.
However, once there was no longer a justification for contact between Mr. Page and the
officer, it was not reasonable for the officer to seize Mr. Page’s driver’s license and go back to
his patrol vehicle to run a record check. Id. at 847.
Here, Officer Orvis, after seeing the driver violate the traffic laws, initiated an
encounter with the driver to let him know of the traffic violation. Officer Orvis was within
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Page in taking the driver’s driver’s license and checking his driving status, and doing so
constituted a seizure of the driver.

1.

The District Court Erred In Finding Officer Orvis Had Reasonable, Articulable
Suspicion Criminal Activity Was Afoot At The House

The district court’s finding that Officer Orvis “had reasonable articulable suspicion to
believe that the driver and the passengers in the vehicle had or were about to unlawfully enter
the empty residence” is erroneous.

(R., p.119.)

Officer Orvis did not have reasonable,

articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing regarding the house—while he had confirmed
that it was possibly uninhabited, there was no evidence of criminal activity and the access
points were all secure. (7/26/16 Tr., p.24, Ls.10-21; p.63, Ls.14-24.) Further, while the car
that pulled up next to the house was similar to the one that had reportedly been parked in the
driveway of the house earlier, it was not described as being the same color. (7/26/16 Tr., p.41,
L.21 – p.42, L.1.) Further, the location in which the driver parked the silver car was different
from that reported by the neighbor—in the driveway versus on the street. (7/26/16 Tr., p.15,
Ls.15-20, p.24, Ls.16-21.) Finally, the passengers were still in the car, only the driver had
exited the car and gone towards the front door of the house. (7/26/16 Tr., p.26, Ls.1-4.)
The facts of Ms. Elwood’s case are similar to State v. Zapata-Reyes, 144 Idaho 703
(Ct. App. 2007) and State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013) (holding, “Although the
officer stated that he believed Morgan may have been trying to avoid him, the officer provided
no factual justification for that belief. Absent other circumstances, driving around the block on
a Friday night does not rise to the level of specific, articulable facts that justify an investigatory
stop.”), both of which involved denials of motions to suppress that were reversed on appeal. In
Zapata-Reyes, a resident called the police and reported that he was concerned that his house
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may be shot at by three or four people in a “white Corsica, or Buick like, a Pontiac.” Id. at
705. The police then located a white Oldsmobile in the area, in which Mr. Zapata-Reyes was
the sole passenger, and proceeded to inquire of him and eventually search him. Id.
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order denying
Zapata-Reyes' motion to suppress.

Id. at 709.

The Court held that the totality of the

circumstances did not provide reasonable and articulable suspicion that he had committed or
was going to commit a crime. Id. The Court based its holding on the fact that the caller did
not indicate how much time had passed since the last time the car had driven by his home; the
caller described a car of common color and did not provide any other significant distinguishing
characteristics to help identify the car; no evidence was presented to show whether the
Oldsmobile Zapata-Reyes was in resembled a Corsica or Buick; and the caller stated there
were three or four people in the car, not two. Id. at 708–709.
The vehicle in Zapata-Reyes was described as a white passenger car; in this case the
description was a “white car.” (R., p.110.). Just as in Zapata-Reyes, Officer Orvis was
provided with no significant distinguishing features, and there was no information as to when
the white vehicle had been seen in the driveway.
However, the facts of Ms. Elwood’s case are similar to Morgan, and thus easily
distinguishable from Naverette v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014),6 and

6

In Navarette an anonymous caller reported that they had been run off the road five minutes
earlier, and identified the automobile by type and license plate. Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 168687. Thereafter, an officer spotted the vehicle and pulled it over.Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 1687.
The defendants filed motions to suppress asserting the officers lacked reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot, which were denied. Id. The United States Supreme Court found
that it was reasonable under the circumstances for the officer to perform a traffic stop, and
noted that while the caller was anonymous, she had eyewitness knowledge of the driver, gave a
detailed description of the automobile, and made a 911 call shortly after the incident occurred.
Id. at __, 134 S. Ct. at 1689.
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Zapata-Reyes because there was no criminal conduct being investigated. Officer Orvis was not
provided with information that would constitute criminal activity. Officer Orvis’ testified that
all he knew of the “suspicious circumstances” was that a neighbor reported a white car in the
driveway of a home believed to be unoccupied/abandoned. (7/26/16 Tr., p.15, Ls.6-20.) It is
not illegal for a car to be parked in the driveway of a house, even if the neighbors believe the
house may be vacant. It is not illegal or criminal for there to be clothes and garbage or food
items inside a house that the neighbors suspect might be vacant. At most, it is weird; however,
these facts do not necessitate additional investigation, particularly where the homeowner had
not even been contacted or their permission given for the police to enter the house or be on the
curtilage. In fact, Officer Orvis had concluded whatever investigation he performed at the
request of the concerned neighbors when the silver car pulled up and parked on the street in
front of the house. (7/26/16 Tr., p.24, Ls.10-21, p.63, Ls.14-24.)
Like the four left turns in Morgan, the neighbor here did not have eyewitness
knowledge of criminal activity, merely a suspicion. Nor did the officers’ observations of the
house warrant further investigation. Officer Orvis testified that, after checking the access
points, “At that point I had exhausted every investigative technique that I had.” (7/26/16
Tr., p.23, L.1 – p.24, L.15, p.63, L.25 – p.64, L.4.) “Even a reliable tip will justify an
investigative stop only if it creates reasonable suspicion that ‘criminal activity may be afoot.’”
Navarette, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. at 1690 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30). Here, there was not
even a viable claim of trespassing, where the owner of the home had not even been contacted
to determine whether they had authorized someone to be at the home or park in the driveway.
There was no crime.
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2.

The District Court Erred In Finding Officer Orvis Had Reasonable, Articulable
Suspicion To Support A Drug Investigation When He Approached The Car

When Officer Orvis obtained identification cards and driver’s licenses from the
passengers, he unlawfully seized all of the passengers in the vehicle, however, the seizure was
not justified by reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. There had been no
criminal activity identified at the house. Further, the facts surrounding Officer Orvis’ initial
encounter with the passengers did not give rise to reasonable and articulable suspicion of drug
activity such that the officer could initiate a drug investigation at that point. Based on the
totality of the circumstances, Officer Orvis did not have reasonable, articulable suspicion that
the vehicle’s occupants possessed illegal narcotics when he initially seized them. The district
court erred in so finding.
After Officer Orvis collected the driver of the vehicle’s driver’s license and then told
him to go sit in the car. (7/26/16 Tr., p.50, Ls.2-11.) Officer Orvis testified that at that point
the driver was not free to leave, and the occupants of the car were not free to leave either.
(7/26/16 Tr., p.51, L.24 – p.52, Ls.4.) Officer Orvis then collected identification cards and
driver’s licenses from all of the people in the car. (7/26/16 Tr., p.31, Ls.9-12, p.38, Ls.17-21,
p.40, Ls.11-18, p.52, Ls.2-7; R., p.112.) Once the driver of a vehicle is seized, the passenger
reasonably feels subject to suspicion and is also seized. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249,
257-259 (2007). While the initial encounter with the driver may have been consensual, it
quickly turned into a seizure when Officer Orvis took his driver’s license, and then the
identifications of the car’s passengers and pulled his car, with the lights flashing, behind the
silver car.
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The district court based this conclusion on three facts, holding that, when viewed in the
totality of the circumstances, these facts would lead the officer to conclude that the vehicle’s
occupants were engaged in illicit drug activities:
When Officer Orvis approached the suspect vehicle to gather identification from
the occupants, the focus of his investigation quickly shifted form the earlier
inquiry to an investigation of illicit drug activities, based on the furtive
movements of the vehicle occupants, the Defendant’s behaviors suggesting
narcotics impairment, and the recognition of Mr. Schlapia with knowledge of his
background in illegal drug activities.
(R., p.124.)
The district court also found significant the officer’s impression that the passengers in
the vehicle demonstrated difficulty or reluctance to provide identifying information to the
officer. (R., p.113.) Further, they avoided looking into the officer’s eyes. (R., p.113.) The
district court found that Ms. Elwood exhibited quick, jerky movements, she was slow to
respond to questions, and she appeared nervous.

(R., p.123; 7/26/16 Tr., p.39, Ls.4-7.)

However, the court’s legal conclusion that Officer Orvis had reasonable, articulable suspicion
of criminal wrongdoing when he approached the vehicle is clearly erroneous.
As previously discussed herein in Section 1, the late night suspicious activity call
involved an unoccupied house and such a vague report does not give rise to reasonable,
articulable suspicion of drug activity. The court’s next factor—that one of the passengers had
a prior history of drug use/involvement—does not give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion
of current drug activity. A prior criminal record “is not, standing alone, sufficient to create
reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Davis, 94 F.3d 1465, 1469 (10th Cir. 1996).
Assuming arguendo, that Ms. Elwood’s response was slow, a slow response or
hesitation in answering does not constitute probable cause or even reasonable suspicion to
believe that Ms. Elwood was involved in criminal activity. In fact, any search pursuant to what
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Officer Orvis subjectively felt was a slow response to his question was based solely on a
hunch, which does not qualify as an exception to the warrant requirement. Further, avoidance
of eye contact does not provide reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.
See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 130-31 (2000) (in which government conceded that “an
innocent person—even one distrustful of the police—might ‘avoid eye contact or even sneer at
the sight of an officer,’ and that would not justify a Terry stop or any sort of per se
inference.”); see also Snow v. State, 578 A.2d 816, 824 (Maryland 1990) (holding that driver
was nervous and avoided making eye contact; was traveling from Philadelphia to Washington,
D.C.; had three air fresheners hung from the rear-view mirror; and did not consent to the
requested search of the vehicle did not constitute reasonable, articulable suspicion of drug
activity).
When pressed, Officer Orvis admitted that he perceived Ms. Elwood only as acting
“nervous.”7 (7/26/16 Tr., p.52, Ls.15-25.) A person’s nervous demeanor during an encounter
with law enforcement “is of limited significance in establishing the presence of reasonable
suspicion” “because it is common for people to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted
with law enforcement regardless of criminal activity.” State v. Gibson, 141 Idaho 277, 285-86
(Ct. App. 2005); see also State v. Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2016) (noting that “lawful,
albeit unusual, conduct” is insufficient, standing alone, for reasonable suspicion). Nervous

7

During the suppression hearing, defense counsel took a recess to allow Officer Orvis time to
review the video recording of his contact with the driver and passengers because, “everything
that you’re saying is inconsistent with your video.” (7/26/16 Tr., p.44, Ls.1-20.) Although the
video recording was not admitted at the hearing, when defense counsel again asked Officer
Orvis about Ms. Elwood’s behavior, Officer Orvis agreed that she just looked nervous.
(7/26/16 Tr., p.52, Ls.15-19, p.64, Ls.11-16.) He also claimed that the furtive movements he
observed by the back seat passengers could not be seen on the video’s narrow field of view.
(7/26/16 Tr., p.52, L.20 - p.53, L.22.)
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behavior, standing alone, is insufficient for reasonable suspicion. See United States v. ChavezValenzuela, 268 F.3d 719, 726 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that no circuit court has held that
nervousness alone suffices for reasonable suspicion and holding that even extreme nervousness
alone does not support reasonable suspicion), amended by United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela,
279 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other grounds by Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93
(2005). Ms. Elwood’s nervous behavior, in and of itself, does not create a reasonable suspicion
that she had committed or was about to commit a drug-related crime.
As the final factor of its analysis, the district court found it significant that the
passengers made furtive movements when Officer Orvis ran their identification while sitting in
his patrol car. (R., p.124.) However, the “furtive movements” of the occupants adds nothing
that supports reasonable suspicion of drug activity. This is demonstrated by Officer Orvis’
initial testimony that the furtive movements made him concerned for officer safety. (7/26/16
Tr., p.29, Ls.11-14.) Although he later testified the furtive movements formed a basis for him
to believe the passengers “were trying to hide items of contraband, specifically drugs and/or
narcotic paraphernalia” (7/26/16 Tr., p.29, L.15 - p.30, L.4), his initial reaction was a safety
concern, not that the occupants of the car might be hiding contraband. Further, the occupants’
engagement in furtive movements did not occur until after the officer had collected the
identifications of those in the car and was calling them in to dispatch.8 (R., p.112.) This could
not have formed the basis for the initial seizure of the passengers of the car. Thus, the district
court’s conclusion was clearly erroneous where the other two facts—the presence of someone
with a criminal history of drug convictions and the nervousness of Ms. Elwood—were not

8

In arguing thusly, Ms. Elwood does not concede the issue, but maintains that the three facts,
even aggregated to be viewed in the totality of the circumstances, did not provide reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.
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sufficient, even together, to give rise to reasonable, articulable suspicion that illegal drugs were
present.
Here, none of the objective circumstances preceding the officer’s detention of
Ms. Elwood and the vehicle’s occupants justify his suspicion that they were involved in
criminal activity. None of the circumstances known to Officer Orvis at the time of the seizure
establish a reasonable suspicion to justify the seizure.
Thus, the detention of Ms. Elwood was illegal because it was not supported by
reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. The fruits of the search of
Ms. Elwood that followed that illegal detention must therefore be suppressed as “fruit of the
poisonous tree.” See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 478-488 (1963); State v.
Schrecengost, 134 Idaho 547, 549 (Ct. App. 2000).

CONCLUSION
Ms. Elwood respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment
and order of probation and reverse the order which denied her motion for enlargement of time
and her motion to suppress.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2017.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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